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Public health ofﬁcials, when faced with scarce medical resources
such as limited vaccines, have primarily focused on designing
allocation strategies that are efﬁcient so that the prevalence and
intensity of infection can be minimized. If the improved efﬁ-
ciency helps overcome the scarcity, the problem is solved but if it
persists, a set of rules is needed to prioritize individuals in a way
that the distribution is fair. To evaluate the fairness of a rule,
however, a systematic procedure is needed.
Various criteria can be applied to justify whether a speciﬁc
allocation rule is appropriate when it comes to the distribution of
a limited stockpile of vaccines. Broadly speaking, they can be
categorized into two classes: efﬁciency and fairness. The former
concentrates on how well a rule drives the system to the most
efﬁcient outcome, whereas the latter focuses on how well the
allocation rule addresses some fairness criteria, that is, axioms
that prescribe the relative importance of each individual on the
basis of only some of his or her features, which are irrelevant to
the resulting outcomes. In reality, an allocation rule is often
justiﬁed by both criteria. For example, in a market economy, the
efﬁciency rule suggests that individuals should be paid their
marginal contributions to the society to motivate them to
produce the maximum output whereas fairness is covered
through redistribution mechanisms, such as taxes and subsidies,which transfer resources from the rich to the poor, the weak,
and so on.
Researchers in the public health area have extensively studied
the efﬁciency aspects of allocations of a limited stockpile of
vaccines. The “proper” or efﬁcient distribution rules have been
shown to minimize the disease prevalence, maximize quality-
adjusted years, or minimize economic costs among other things
[1–3]. Because all measures of efﬁciency are based on outcomes of
the resulting epidemic, it is straightforward to quantify the
degree of efﬁciency for each distribution rule postepidemic.
The other aspect of the problem, that is, fairness, remains
insufﬁciently investigated in the literature. There have been very
few studies that focused on the fairness of distribution strategies,
and the criteria for prioritizing the most important individuals
are subjective. Speciﬁcally, researchers have suggested four kinds
of fairness: treating people equally, favoring the worst-off, max-
imizing total beneﬁts, and promoting and rewarding social use-
fulness [4–6]. Given that these analyses in the literature are
totally based on qualitative analysis, researchers lack a general
methodology to quantitatively measure the degree of fairness of
each distribution rule and objectively assess the trade-off
between efﬁciency and fairness.
The above problem leads to the main motivation for this
work. This research builds a general framework, similar to the
Gini coefﬁcient, which measures income inequality, to quantifyociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
ics and Simulation Science Laboratory, Virginia Bioinformatics
ginia Tech., 1880 Pratt Drive (0477), Blacksburg, VA 24061.
Table 1 – Summary of variables and notations.
L Stockpile of vaccines
|N| Population size
ωi Weight of individual iwhile computing efﬁciency
Xi Vector of demographics for individual i
V (Xi) Individual i’s priority, given Xi and fairness
characterized by V(  )
α A generic fairness degree in the interval [0,1]
D A generic vaccine allocation rule
PD,V(  ) Cumulative allocation function given allocation rule
D and fairness V(  )
D_α(V) Uniquely determined allocation rule whose fairness
degree is α given V(  )
PVα Cumulative allocation function of allocation rule
D_α(V)
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 7 8 – 2 8 3 279the degree of fairness given a corresponding axiom of fairness.
With the help of this framework, we investigate the relationship
between the efﬁciency and fairness of various vaccine allocation
strategies during an inﬂuenzalike illness (ILI) epidemic.
Our results show that a distribution rule with a very high degree
of fairness is usually harmful to the society because it is applied at
the cost of efﬁciency, and the most efﬁcient distribution rule turns
out to be not the fairest one. Speciﬁcally, this research ﬁnds that
distribution strategies that use household size, life cycle, and
network degree as criteria are well aligned with efﬁciency to a
large extent. In all scenarios, to be 100% fair, however, some
efﬁciency must be sacriﬁced. A mixed criterion based on both
household size and age does better than the individual ones.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second
section deﬁnes the framework for quantifying the degree of
fairness and efﬁciency. The third section simulates various
distribution strategies during an ILI epidemic on a realistic social
network. The fourth section discusses empirical results and their
implications, and the last section concludes.The Framework to Measure Fairness
We ﬁrst deﬁne the general forms of efﬁciency and fairness that
are suitable for empirical studies.
Baseline. For an epidemic on graph GðN,TÞ, where N is the set of
vertices and T denotes all edges, for a given individual i 2 N, f i Gð Þ
denotes the probability of i getting infected without any intervention.
Intervention. Now consider an intervention, that is, distribution
of a limited stockpile of L vaccines to the public. Based on a set of
demographic variables Xi for each individual i, let D Xið Þ 2 0,1½  be
the probability that the individual gets vaccinated, such thatPjNj
i¼1 D xið Þ¼L.
Let hi G, Dð Þ be the probability of individual i getting infected
when the intervention policy depicted by function DðUÞ is in place.
Deﬁnition 1. Given a vector of weights W¼ ωið Þi2N, the efﬁ-
ciency of policy D is deﬁned as E D,Wð Þ¼ PjNji¼1 ωi f i Gð Þhi G, Dð Þ .
Given that the term
P
ωiUf i Gð Þ is ﬁxed and exogenously given,
let us just focus on the value of
P
ωiUhi G,Dð Þ while comparing the
efﬁciency of different intervention policies. Intuitively speaking,
given the corresponding weights of individuals for an interven-
tion, the efﬁciency is (negatively) determined by the weighted
sum of individual costs caused by the epidemic. For this reason,
we deﬁne E^ D,Wð Þ¼ PjNji¼1 ωiUhiðG,DÞ as the social cost, after apply-
ing the intervention characterized by D, and focus mainly on this
term in the rest of the article.
The deﬁnition of fairness of an intervention, however, is more
complicated. The term “fairness” should be derived from some
axiom that justiﬁes the set of people who should get vaccinated
for some righteous reasons. Formally speaking, given a function
V : Xi-ℝ, an axiom of fairness characterized by V claims that
individuals should get vaccinated according to their importance
as determined by V. Then, given V, it is easy to deﬁne the fairest
distribution rule D1 Vð Þ and the unfairest distribution rule D0 Vð Þ:
First rank all VðXiÞ values in descending order, the distribution
rule D1 Vð Þ will vaccinate only the ﬁrst L individuals, whereas the
distribution rule D0 Vð Þ vaccinates only the last L individuals.
All other distribution rules that assign L vaccines to individ-
uals in N, must reside somewhere between the fairest and the
unfairest rules. To further quantify the degree of fairness for any
distribution rule, we deﬁne a cumulative allocation function,
PD,V Uð Þ, for any distribution rule D and fairness axiom V: Rank
all individuals in descending order of their VðXiÞ values, then for
fraction λ 2 0,1½ , PD,VðλÞ tells us, in expected values, the propor-
tion of L vaccines that have been distributed out to the ﬁrst λjNj
individuals. Obviously, we have PD,V 0ð Þ¼0, PD,V 1ð Þ¼1, and PD,VðUÞis a non-decreasing function. Table 1 provides a summary of the
variables and notations used in the paper.
PD1 ,VðλÞ equals λjNjL if λo LjNj and 1 otherwise. PD0, VðλÞ equals
λ1þ L
N  jNjL if λZ1 LjNj and 0 otherwise. Any other curve of
PD,VðUÞ should locate between these two and constitute a closed
image with either of them. For this reason, it is reasonable to
deﬁne the fairness degree of D as the relative area between
curves PD,VðUÞ and PD0,VðUÞ.
Deﬁnition 2. Given an axiom characterized by V, the fairness
degree of D is the area between curves PD,VðαÞ and PD0 ,VðαÞ, normal-
ized by the area between curves PD1 ,VðαÞ and PD0,VðαÞ, where α is the
degree of fairness. Next, we would like to characterize a distribution
rule exclusively by its degree of fairness, but according to the above
setting, for any fairness degree α 2 0, 1ð Þ, there are inﬁnitely many
distribution rules whose fairness degree is exactly α. To make our
analysis tractable, we investigate only a subclass of distribution rules,
namely, rules that have up to two-piece linear cumulative distribu-
tion functions. More speciﬁcally, for all distribution rules with fairness
degree higher than or equal to 0:5, we work with the one that
vaccinates a proportion with the highest V Xið Þ values for sure and
distributes the remaining vaccines to the rest uniformly randomly.
Analogously, for all distribution rules with fairness degree
smaller than 0:5, we select only the one that vaccines a propor-
tion with the smallest V Xið Þ values and distributes the remaining
vaccines to the rest uniformly randomly. By doing so, given any
fairness degree α 2 0,1½ , a distribution rule Dα Vð Þ is uniquely
determined, and for any PDα ,VðUÞ, we can thus write PVα Uð Þ for short.
For instance, in Figure 1, the area between curves PV0:3 and P
V
0
should be 30% of the area between curves PV1 and P
V
0 .
To sum up, we have introduced a general framework to
measure the degree of fairness of any vaccine allocation rule.
Furthermore, given any fairness degree α 2 0, 1½ , we focus on a
unique allocation rule that can be characterized exclusively by α,
given the axiom of fairness V.Methods
Next, we describe the simulation methods, experimental settings,
efﬁciency criteria as well as various axioms of fairness.
Disease Model and Simulation Setting
We use an agent-based epidemic simulation tool called EpiFast
[7] to study the propagation of an ILI over the social contact
network of Montgomery County in Southwest Virginia. The
synthetic population, representing approximately 75,000 individ-
uals, is obtained through a detailed population synthesis pro-
cess that makes it statistically indistinguishable from the US
census data when aggregated to a block group level [8].
Fig. 1 – Curves for cumulative function PVα ðUÞ with fairness
degree α being equal to 1, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, and 0, respectively.
Only 20% of the whole population gets vaccinated.
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sponding locations are assigned to each individual to generate a
colocation-based social contact network. The estimation of the
social network is described in detail in several peer-reviewed
studies [9–11].
A Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered model is used to
represent the disease progression within the host. This is a widely
used disease model in epidemiology. There are no deaths and births
in the model, and each health individual is initially assigned as
susceptible. Once an individual has been infected but is not
infectious, he or she enters the incubation period and is thus labeled
as exposed; after the incubation period, he or she becomes infec-
tious; once an infectious individual recovers, he or she becomes
immune to the disease and is thus labeled as recovered.
For each individual, the incubation period duration is sampled
from a discrete distribution with a mean of 1.9  0.49 days and the
infectious period duration is sampled from a discrete distribution
with a mean of 4.1  0.89 days [12]. Five infections from external
sources occur within the population each day to seed the epidemic.
The simulation is run for 300 days. Only 15,000 vaccines are
assumed to be available, which means that only 20% of the
population can get vaccinated. These individuals are chosen at
the beginning of the simulation on the basis of different fairness
criteria. The efﬁcacy of the vaccine is assumed to be 90%.
Recall that for any fairness degree, a proportion of vaccines is
distributed to individuals with the greatest (or the smallest) V Xið Þ
values, and the remaining vaccines are distributed to other individ-
uals uniformly randomly. To account for the stochasticity embedded
in the random distribution part, for each degree of fairness, we run
30 simulation replicates and report the average of these results.
Efﬁciency Measures
We consider two standard measures of (negative) efﬁciency in
the present work: the prevalence rate of the disease and the loss
in the total number of quality days.
Disease prevalence
Our ﬁrst measure of (negative) efﬁciency is prevalence of disease,
namely, the number of infected individuals in the population.This measure is widely used in practice and the literature
because the prevalence of a disease is a signal of how severely
the disease is affecting the society. As a result, this measure can,
to some extent, serve as a proxy for social costs due to the
disease. Under this measure, each individual is weighted equally.
Quality days lost
Different individuals are valued differently by the society, and
thus should be assigned different weights on the basis of their
value while considering the efﬁciency of an intervention.
We use the survey results given in Cropper et al. [13], who
used age to determine the weights of the individuals. The
negative efﬁciency is then measured by the sum of weighted
infectious days lost.
By ﬁtting the results into a simplistic function, the weight, ωi ,
for each individual is given as follows:
4:1
11 110:3 30Agei
  
, if Ageir30,
max 0, 4:111 110:4 Agei30
  	 

, if Agei430,
(
ð1Þ
where Agei stands for the age of individual i. This function simply
claims that 30-year-old individuals should be given the highest
weight and the younger and older should be valued less impor-
tant. This idea is also explained in Emanuel and Wertheimer [5],
who argue that the importance of an individual should be
calculated on the basis of two considerations: how many resour-
ces have already been invested in that person and how many
years are left to complete an ordinary life cycle. The youth are
weighted less because less investment has been made in them so
far, and the old are weighted less because they have fewer years
to live to complete a life cycle. Hence, middle-aged individuals
are given the highest weights.
Furthermore, to make the “loss in quality days” meaningful in
reality, the weights are normalized by factor 4:111 for all individuals.
By doing so, ωi for individuals aged 30 years is set to be 4.1, which
is exactly the average number of infection days. In other words,
we take 4.1 quality days lost for an infected individual who is
aged 30 years, and the quality days lost for all other individuals
are set accordingly such that their relative days lost are revealed
by their relative importance.
To understand the intuition behind this treatment, recall that
the mean infection period in our simulation model is 4.1 days, so
without lost of generality every individual is assumed to spend
4.1 days to recover from the disease. The 4.1 days for different
individuals, however, may be valued differently according to
their importance in the society. So, we normalize the lost days
of disease for individuals aged 30 years as 4.1 full days and
discount others’ accordingly. The probability of infection is
calculated empirically for each person by averaging the health
outcomes over 30 replicates. The expected number of quality
days lost in an epidemic is calculated by summing up the number
of days lost to infection for all individuals, weighted by their
respective ωi.
Fairness Axioms
Three axioms of fairness have been investigated in this research:
taxpayer, life cycle, and investment-adjusted life cycle.
Taxpayer
This axiom simply states that households who pay more taxes
should be given higher priority because they ﬁnancially contrib-
ute most to the society. Given that we do not have data on taxes
paid by the households, we use household income as a proxy to
prioritize the individuals. Formally, we have V Xið Þ¼HIi, where HIi
stands for the taxes paid by the household to which individual i
belongs. Note that through this axiom, we can study another
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ﬁrst, which is deﬁned by V Xið Þ¼HIi. Hence, an intervention with
fairness α under the taxpayer axiom could also be regarded as an
intervention with fairness 1α under the poorest-ﬁrst axiom.
Life cycle
The life-cycle axiom states that priority should be given to the
youngest individuals. It is justiﬁed by the idea that all individuals
have the right to go through a complete life cycle, and the
youngest need to be protected most because they have lived
the smallest fractions of a complete life cycle. Formally, we have
here V Xið Þ¼Agei, where Agei is individual's i’s age.
Investment-adjusted life cycle
This axiom states that priority should be given to middle-aged
individuals as stated in Equation 1 because a substantial invest-
ment has been made and the person has many more years left to
live. Formally speaking, V Xið Þ¼ωi, where ωi is as deﬁned in
Equation 1.Results and Discussion
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the efﬁciency and
fairness measures. Figure 2A shows the efﬁciency-fairness rela-
tionships when “disease prevalence rate” is used as the efﬁciency
measure, whereas Figure 2B shows the same when “quality days
lost” is taken as the efﬁciency measure.
Figure 2A,B shows that the choice of the efﬁciency measure
does not qualitatively change the results: For the taxpayer and
life-cycle fairness, Figure 2A,B shows that although an improve-
ment in fairness is accompanied by an improvement in efﬁciency
at a low degree of fairness (o0.5), no obvious trends exist for
greater fairness degrees.
More strikingly, in case of investment-adjusted life-cycle fair-
ness, pursuing fairness actually harms the efﬁciency. Note that in
Figure 2A,B, the curves intersect each other at a fairness degree of
0.5. This is not a coincidence; recall that according to the
deﬁnition of the fairness degree of a speciﬁc distribution rule,
the cumulative allocation function of the distribution rule with a
fairness degree of 0.5 should be a straight line between pointsFig. 2 – Relationship between (negative) efﬁciency and fairness of
rate and (B) the quality days lost as the efﬁciency measure. Simu
County in Southwest Virginia. Only 20% of the population getsð0,0Þ and ð1,1Þ, that is, curve PV0:5 in Figure 1. In other words, this
distribution rule treats all individuals equally by allocating
vaccines uniformly randomly to the society. Strictly speaking,
there exist inﬁnitely many distribution rules whose fairness
degree is 0.5. After imposing the two-piece linearity requirement
on the curves of cumulative allocation functions, however, the
straight curve shown in Figure 1 is the unique rule for consid-
eration. This speciﬁc distribution rule is fairness-independent;
that is, regardless of the fairness axiom, the fairness-degree-0.5
distribution rule remains the same. As stated before, we run 30
replicates for each distribution rule to deal with the randomness
embedded in the selection process, and report the average of the
simulation results; for all distribution rules that follow α¼0:5, the
average results are statistically identical, as shown in Figure 2.
Although the curves exhibit signiﬁcant variation for higher
degrees of fairness, the left-hand side of the curves share a common
diminishing trend. This, in turn, suggests an important ﬁnding; that
is, for each axiom of fairness, the inverse of it would not be a
reasonable criterion. It would not make sense to give priority to
older people or less invested individuals. It may be reasonable to
consider, however, the inverse of the taxpayer-based fairness axiom,
that is, giving priority to the poor, which is discussed below.
Vaccinate the Rich or the Poor?
Some people might argue that priority should be given to the
poor people who otherwise may not be able to afford the vaccine.
Our results in Figure 2 suggest that the poorest-ﬁrst fairness is
inconsistent with both efﬁciency measures. In Figure 2A, if the
vaccines are distributed uniformly randomly to all individuals as
in the case of α¼0:5, the expected disease prevalence is about
13.5%; however, after implementing the fairest distribution under
the poorest-ﬁrst axiom (i.e., the least fair choice under the
taxpayer axiom), the disease prevalence increases to about
17.5%—the peak of the curve. However, the taxpayer fairness
axiom neither improves the efﬁciency nor harms it—the right-
hand side of the corresponding curve is rather ﬂat in Figure 2A,B.
Vaccinate on the Basis of Age?
Next, we compare the results of the life-cycle–based and
investment-adjusted life-cycle–based axioms. If the life-cyclevaccine allocation strategies, with (A) the disease prevalence
lations are run on a synthetic social network of Montgomery
vaccinated. Vaccine efﬁcacy is set at 90%.
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fairness of the interventions does help improve the efﬁciency in
both cases despite some ﬂuctuations at a fairly high degree of
fairness. Furthermore, the fairest distribution rule in this case
leads to the most efﬁcient result.
The result for the investment-adjusted life-cycle rule, how-
ever, is more striking. Under our experimental settings, we ﬁnd
that assigning more weight to the middle-aged individuals and
pursuing fairness harms the society in terms of both a high
prevalence rate and a greater loss in the total number of quality
days. Nevertheless, some researchers in the literature have
argued that this kind of intervention combined with some other
rules should be well aligned with efﬁciency [5,14].
One explanation for this could be that assigning weights to
individuals on the basis of their investment and potential is quite
different from assigning weights to them on the basis of their
relevance in the spread of an epidemic. The former mainly
considers people’s values to the society, whereas the latter
depends on people’s positions in the social contact network.
Although these two considerations may overlap to some
extent, for example, individuals in their 30s may have more social
contacts than do those much younger or much older, the weight-
ing method for the investment-adjusted life cycle does not seem
to be a good proxy for the connectivity in the social network.
Vaccinate on the Basis of Network Degrees?
In a social network, individuals with the highest network degrees
or connectivity are the ones who may help propagate the
epidemic by getting infected and infecting others. For this reason,
it is often argued that priority should be give to the highest
degree individuals [15]. However, the network degree weighted by
duration may be even more accurate because it accounts for not
only the connectivity of the individual but also the duration of
each contact. The problem is that even if it is a good strategy, in
reality, it is hard to implement because of the lack of availability
of information on people’s contacts and their durations.
To overcome this challenge, we consider the size of the
household as a proxy for the network degree and the weighted
network degree. Although it represents only a subgraph of the
entire social network for each individual, it is a useful proxyFig. 3 – Relationship between (negative) efﬁciency and fairness of
rate and (B) the quality days lost as the efﬁciency measure. Simu
County in Southwest Virginia. Only 20% of the population getsbecause it is more easily observable and implementable by
policymakers. For our synthetic social network, we have com-
plete information on each individual’s contacts, the duration of
each contact as well as the household sizes. Figure 3 considers
each of the options, that is, network degree, weighted network
degree, and the household size, to compare the trade-off between
efﬁciency and fairness.
Figure 3 shows that the weighted network degree–based fair-
ness is the most consistent with measures of efﬁciency. Social
costs in terms of prevalence and lost days continue to drop as the
degree of fairness increases. The inverse of this strategy would
lead to the highest social costs and level of inefﬁciency. Surpris-
ingly, network degree results are quite different from weighted
network degree results. For fairness degrees greater than 0.5,
further improvement in fairness actually reduces efﬁciency. This
result suggests that contact durations are more important than
the number of contacts in the spread of the epidemic, and hence
the network degree, although more observable, may not be used
as a proxy for the weighted degree.
However, household size seems to be a good proxy for the
weighted degree. This is because within-household contacts play
an important role and represent a large part of the interaction
duration for the individuals. Furthermore, data on household size
are conveniently available from the census. In case of household
size, fairness improves with the efﬁciency under both measures in
Figure 3. This means that in our speciﬁc setting, if the authority
has to choose a fairness principle that is implementable and leads
to efﬁcient results, it should be the household-size fairness.
Mixed Principle
All fairness principles considered so far have been based on a
single variable, but recall that in our framework, fairness could be
based on a vector of demographic variables Xi. This means that
we should be able to evaluate whether a multivariable criteria
performs better than individual ones. In particular, the life-cycle
fairness principle is the most consistent with efﬁciency measures
than are other fairness criteria in Figure 2 and the household-size
principle performs better than the others in Figure 3 and is
implementable. It is possible that a combination of them per-
forms better than either of them individually, so we design a newvaccine allocation strategies, with (A) the disease prevalence
lations are run on a synthetic social network of Montgomery
vaccinated. Vaccine efﬁcacy is set at 90%.
Fig. 4 – Relationship between (negative) efﬁciency and fairness of vaccine allocation strategies, with (A) the disease prevalence
rate and (B) the quality days lost as the efﬁciency measure. Simulations are run on a synthetic social network of Montgomery
County in Southwest Virginia. Only 20% of the population gets vaccinated. Vaccine efﬁcacy is set at 90%.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 7 8 – 2 8 3 283criterion, which gives priority to young individuals from large
households.
The relationship between mixed fairness and efﬁciency is
illustrated in Figure 4. We also include results of the life-cycle and
household-size fairness in the same ﬁgure for comparison pur-
poses. As shown in the ﬁgure, mixed fairness is most well aligned
with efﬁciency measures. This suggests that, for our speciﬁc
example, distribution rules based on the mixed fairness principle
could be an ideal choice for public health ofﬁcials who aim to
achieve both efﬁciency and fairness.Conclusions
This study contributes to the public health debate on whom to
protect when everyone cannot be protected, and how to prioritize
the distribution of limited vaccines. Allocating limited resources
is always a challenge but lives are at stake when it comes to
medical resources. This article, for the ﬁrst time, provides a
general framework to assess the fairness and efﬁciency of public
health intervention policies. It develops appropriate axioms of
fairness and examines the trade-offs between efﬁciency and
fairness under these axioms by providing objective ways of
measuring fairness. If public health authorities come up with a
new distribution rule, this framework can help determine its
degree of fairness and can help alleviate some of the ethical
concerns.
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